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Abstract 
This paper assesses the role of collateral by examining if collateral matters for loans i.e., if 
the lack of conventional collateral limits access to institutional credit in rural areas. It also discusses 
conditions under which collateral matters for loans by analyzing the constraints found in using 
collateral/collateral substitutes in different types of environments for various categories of 
borrowers. The analyses based on literature survey shows that while collateral matters for improving 
access to loans and to loans of larger size, these relationships may hold only when specific 
conditions such as strong markets and legal institutions, and political and social willingness to allow 
collateral perform its prescribed role are met. Policy recommendations for bankers, governments 
and donors are drawn from the analysis. 
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COLLATERAL FOR LOANS: WHEN DOES IT MATTER? 
by 
Geetha Nagaraj an and Richard L. Meyer1 
In German mythology, some beautiful sirens inhabited a rocky part of Rhine, and through 
lovely songs lured sailors to the rocks despite their awareness of the risks Many lenders, 
like Rhine sailors, have crashed on the rocks of credit loss lured by the siren song of 
collateral communicating security despite the dangers accompanying it-- Peter Larr, The 
Journal of Commercial Lending, 1994. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom holds that collateral in the form of physical assets is useful in securing 
loans and reducing loan losses. The traditional view is that most lenders require collateral for loans 
and that land is the preferred form. In the absence of clear land titles or other forms of collateral or 
collateral substitutes, it is expected that there will be a contraction in the supply of credit thereby 
reducing access to finance for rural borrowers (Binswanger and Mcintire, 1987). Recent theoretical 
literature and limited empirical evidence, however, suggests that collateral performs a much more 
complicated role in lending, that it's use involves costs, that it interacts with several other loan terms 
and conditions that substitute for it, and that it does not always improve access to credit. 
Furthermore, the use of several collateral substitutes has been observed to improve access to loans, 
1 The authors acknowledge with appreciation the suggestions provided by Dale W Adams, 
Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Douglas H. Graham and other colleagues at of The Ohio State 
University, and Pekka Russi of the Food and Agricultural Organization in developing the study. 
Usual disclaimers apply. 
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especially in informal rural fmancial markets, and the institutional environment has been shown to 
have an important influence on the value and acceptability of certain assets as collateral. 
This paper assesses the role of collateral by examining if collateral matters for loans i.e., if 
the lack of conventional collateral limits access to institutional credit in rural areas. It also discusses 
conditions under which collateral matters for loans by analyzing the constraints found in using 
collateral/collateral substitutes in different types of environments for various categories of 
borrowers. Specifically, the paper addresses several issues including: What is collateral? What role 
is there for various types of collateral/collateral substitutes? Can other loan terms and conditions 
effectively substitute for conventional collateral? Can collateral improve access to institutional 
credit for rural populations? How can collateral/collateral substitutes be evaluated? Can we identify 
innovative collateral substitutes used to increase access to formal loans for rural populations? Can 
savings mobilization be used as a potential collateral substitute? The discussion is primarily limited 
to developing countries. 
The paper is organized as follows: after defming collateral and collateral substitutes, the next 
section explores the role of collateral/collateral substitutes in rural fmancial markets. This is 
followed by empirical evidence on the role of collateral, an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses 
of several different types of collateral/collateral substitutes used in developing countries, and a 
discussion of the issues in evaluating collateral/collateral substitutes, especially in countries with a 
weak legal environment. Policy implications conclude the paper. 
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II. DEFINITION OF COLLATERAL AND COLLATERAL SUBSTITUTES 
Collateral is generally required when information about borrowers is costly and unavailable 
for lenders. Collateral is especially important when they attempt to serve new clients. Collateral is 
defmed as an asset that upon liquidation is adequate to cover most or all of the lender's risk exposure 
including principal, accrued interest and collection costs (Larr, 1994). In general, physical assets 
such as land, real estates and chattel mortgages are considered as collateral. 
Binswanger et al. (1986) defined collateral by attaching three attributes to it: collateral is a 
physical asset which satisfies the conditions of (i) appropriability, (ii) absence of collateral-specific 
risks, and (iii) accrual of the returns to the borrower during the loan period. Appropriability refers 
to the ease of liquidating the collateral by the lender in case of default. Collateral-specific risks can 
be reduced by insuring an asset for risks against theft, fire, disease, and by accepting assets that are 
secure from inflation and political risks. Real estate and land with proper title are generally low risk, 
while vehicles and animals constitute more risky assets unless properly insured. Accrual of returns 
to the borrower during the contract period refers to the direct economic returns earned from the use 
of the asset or the indirect economic returns earned from the investments made with loans obtained 
using the asset as collateral. 
The above definition of collateral is restrictive because it precludes as collateral the use of 
non-tradeable assets, including reputation, loss of future loans and social ostracism. These non-
tradeable assets are generally more valuable to the borrower than the lender. Therefore, they can 
reduce moral hazard problems for the lender and can help to enforce contracts even though they will 
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not cover the lender's loan loss 2• Binswanger et al. (1986) extended the definition of collateral to 
include collateral substitutes. Collateral substitutes are defined as non-physical assets with or 
without a market value, or physical assets that have qualities other than collateral to enforce loan 
repayments. Collateral substitutes include interlinked contracts, third party guarantees, moral 
persuasion, threat of loss of future borrowing opportunities, reputation, long-term relationships 
(familial and/or business), group liability, guarantee funds, savings, insurance policies, inventories 
and accounts receivables. Furthermore, some of the loan terms and conditions, such as interest rates 
and penalty conditions, can effectively substituted for collateral (Adams, 1994b ). Indeed, some 
collateral substitutes, such as interlinked contracts, can be included as one of the terms and 
conditions of a loan contract and hence substitute for collateral. 
In practice, what serves as collateral/collateral substitutes depends on the production, social, 
legal, economic and political environment of a country. There is no single official definition or 
consensus concerning the collateral/collateral substitutes used by financial institutions in developing 
countries. For example, in several Near East countries, banks define loan collateral as a measure 
taken by a lender to protect the money lent from misuse or losses. Collateral includes pawning, 
pledging and third party guarantees that have cash value upon liquidation by the lender 
(NENARACA, 1994). In the Philippines, however, while the pledging of land rights is widely 
accepted as collateral, the pawning of cultivation rights is not accepted by banks. In general, 
therefore, collateral/collateral substitutes have evolved through time and their usage is often 
recognized by legal and social statutes. Furthermore, semiformal and informal fmancial 
2 Moral hazard problems refer to the borrowers' failure to make their best effort to keep their 
commitments to the loan contract. 
5 
arrangements have developed collateral substitutes which provide access to loans for many 
borrowers who lack assets required as collateral by formal lenders. 
III. ROLE OF COLLATERAL/COLLATERAL SUBSTITUTES 
The prevalence of collateral as an integral part of credit contracts in many countries 
demonstrates its important role in financial markets. Collateral is perceived to perform several 
functions and ensures that the interests of borrowers and lenders are more closely matched so that 
transactions can be consummated even in environments characterized by high risks in lending and 
high borrowing costs. This section examines the role of collateral/collateral substitutes in improving 
borrower access to loans. 
1. Theoretical Predictions 
A. Functions of Collateral 
The early theoretical models defined the functions of collateral based on the assumption of 
asymmetric valuation of collateral by lenders and borrowers. They focussed on the importance of 
collateral from a supply side dimension and ignored important informational problems (Barro, 1976; 
Benjamin, 1978). Later models, however, incorporated moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
related to information asymmetry, and developed equilibrium implications necessary in assessing 
the role of collateral (Bester, 1985,1987, Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Chan and Kantas, 1985; Chan 
and Thakor, 1987; Plaut, 1985; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Currently, there are two schools of 
thought regarding the functions of collateral: (i) signalling function, and (ii) enforcement function. 
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a. Collateral as a Signalling Device 
The theoretical literature predicts that lenders can use collateral to screen and sort among 
observationally homogenous borrowers. In these models, lenders offer a menu of contracts with 
various combinations of collateral requirements and interest rates. Borrowers with a low probability 
of default are more inclined to accept an increase in collateral requirements for a certain reduction 
m loan interest rates than are those with a high probability of default (Bester, 1985, 1987; Besank:o 
and Thaker, 1987; Chan and Thaker, 1987). Borrowers, therefore, signal their risk types by 
revealing their preferences between collateral and interest rates. Signalling costs for the borrowers 
are the potential loss of collateral when project returns are low. Increases in collateral requirements 
always harm low risk borrowers less than high risk borrowers since their chances of project failure 
are low. Therefore, signalling costs are larger for high risk borrowers. In this way, collateral 
functions as a signalling device and lenders can use it as low cost self-selection and incentive 
mechanism to sort borrowers according to their risk types. 
The signalling value of collateral is, however, linked to the costs of collateralization and the 
ability to collateralize. The ability to collateralize has to be negatively related to the costs of 
collateralization, and asset holdings must be positively related to income or ability to repay so that 
low risk borrowers can identify themselves from high risk ones (Devinney, 1986). Collateral will 
not serve as a signal: (i) if interest rates are sticky, or (ii) ifthe marginal collateralization costs for 
high risk borrowers are less than low risk borrowers so that they prefer to offer more collateral for 
a reduction in loan terms, or (iii) if low risk borrowers have less wealth that can be offered as 
collateral than high risk borrowers. Furthermore, when banks are not diligent in loan collection, high 
risk borrowers will be willing to offer more collateral for lower interest rates, if they are not 
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constramed by assets, since they can escape repayment and foreclosure of collateral. In addition, 
renegotiations on loan extension and collateral foreclosing at the end of a contract may seriously 
undermine the role of collateral as a signalling device since low risk borrowers can no longer 
distinguish themselves by offering more collateral if collateralization becomes attractive also for 
high risk borrowers. In the absence of renegotiation, borrowers with good projects can distinguish 
themselves from bad projects by offering more collateral. When there is chance of renegotiation, 
high risk borrowers will find it advantageous to offer more collateral because they can get better 
loans terms and will not be penalized through foreclosure of collateral for default (Bester, 1994). 
b. Collateral as an Enforcement Device 
Collateral secures the loans against both exogenous and endogenous risks that lead to loan 
default. On the one hand, in the absence of well-defined insurance markets, such as crop insurance, 
loan losses due to exogenous shocks are covered by collateral. On the other hand, collateral 
increases the stake of the borrower in the loan transaction. Endogenous risks are reduced when 
threats of foreclosure of collateral by financial institutions discourages borrowers from engaging in 
moral hazardous activities. 
The enforcement models predict that collateral can perform its functions by either reducing 
the lender's default loss or by making it costly for the borrower to default (Barro, 1976; Benjamin, 
1978). If collateral is used as an incentive against borrower default, then high risk borrowers will 
be required to offer more collateral for a given loan size compared to low risk borrowers. Since 
collateral increases the expected returns to the lender and prevents the borrower from engaging in 
moral hazardous actions, the amount of loan granted is expected to increase, ceteris paribus, as the 
risk adjusted value of collateral increases. The enforcement models, of course, rest on the 
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assumption of a legal environment that facilitates loan enforcement and the marketability of assets 
offered as collateral. 
B. Effects of Collateral 
a. Effect on Loan Terms and Conditions 
Rigorous models have been developed to demonstrate that collateral, ceteris paribus, 
increases loan size or reduces the rates of interest charged on loans (Barro, 1976; Benjamin, 1978; 
Plaut, 1985). Signalling models, under certain assumptions about limits on the availability of 
collateral and the costs of collateralization, predict a substitutability between interest rates and 
collateral. Loan sizes, however, are conditional on the costs of collateralization so there are limits 
to the direct proportionality between collateral and loan size. But, with no costs of collateralization, 
loan sizes are shown to be directly proportional to the mean value of the collateral offered. Barro 
(1976) shows that an increase in the loan to collateral ratio and an increase in the costs of 
collaterilization will increase the expected cost of capital, i.e. the interest rate. Chan and Kantas 
(1985) later proved that interest rates will be increasing and collateral level will be decreasing with 
an increase in the marginal costs of collaterilization. Furthermore, Be!1iamin (1978) argued that the 
costs of collateralization lead to three effects. The greater the costs associated with selling collateral, 
(i) the lower will be the maximum loan granted with collateral, (ii) the greater will be the lender's 
losses in the event of default, and (iii) the greater will be the contractual interest rates for any given 
ratio of loan size to gross market value of the collateral asset. 
Plaut (1985) cautions that the heterogenous attributes of collateral make it difficult to 
unambiguously derive any implications about the use of different types of collateral to increase loan 
sizes. When the costs of collateralization are positive and when there are limitations in foreclosing 
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the collateral, then a riskier asset may make better or worse collateral so the utility of lenders may 
or may not increase with use of collateral and an increase in the average return on an asset may or 
may not make it a better collateral. These ambiguities complicate the development of clear 
relationships between collateral and the other terms of a loan, especially in a static setting with poor 
supporting institutions. 
b. Adverse Selection Effect 
Collateral is expected to have an adverse selection effect because higher collateral 
requirements will deter good borrowers from entering credit markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Wette, 1983). The seminal paper by Stiglitz and Weiss shows that lenders may not choose to use 
collateral as a rationing device since an increase in collateral requirements will function like an 
increase in interest rates which leads to a loss in the lender's expected return on loans because of 
adverse selection. This occurs since increases in collateral requirements will result in less risky 
borrowers dropping out of the credit market. For a given project, an increase in collateral increases 
costs and decreases profits, thereby reducing the project's expected profits for the borrower. Some 
projects that were initially profitable may become unprofitable at higher collateral requirements. 
Furthermore, since wealthier borrowers are able to offer collateral and are less risk averse, they will 
undertake risky projects. The adverse selection effect is so strong that increasing collateral 
requirements beyond a limit will only attract risky clientele and will lower a bank's returns 3• 
c. Matching Effect 
3 The adverse selection effect implies that collateral has no signalling value. But if 
assumptions about the equality of collateralization costs and asset holdings by various types of 
borrowers according to their risk types are relaxed, then collateral will have signalling value and 
will facilitate borrower sorting (Devinney, 1986). 
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CollateraVcollateral substitutes along with the other tenns and conditions of a loan contract 
facilitate the matching of the utility functions of both borrowers and lenders in informal credit 
markets (Esguerra, 1993; Nagarajan, 1992). Ceteris paribus, the matching of lenders and borrowers 
can be explained in part by: (i) the borrower's ability to offer collateraVcollateral substitutes that are 
valued by the lenders resulting in differential access to lenders, and (ii) the lender's ability to provide 
borrower specific services and accept his collateraVcollateral substitutes leading to the borrower's 
contract choice from among the accessible set of contracts. As a result, a predictable pattern of loan 
contracts emerges through the use of collateraVcollateral substitutes that matches heterogenous 
borrowers and lenders. 
d. Credit Rationing 
Credit rationing occurs when certain applicants are denied credit (loan quantity rationing) 
or when some borrowers are supplied with smaller sized loans than demanded (loan size rationing). 
This section refers to loan quantity rationing. The effect of collateral on relaxing credit rationing 
reveals the impact of collateral in increasing rural lending. Theoretical models show that lenders may 
not want to use collateral as a rationing device, and that neither interest rates nor collateral can be 
used to equate supply and demand in credit markets. Credit restrictions take the fonn of limiting the 
number of loans that the bank makes rather than limiting the size of each loan or making interest 
rates an increasing function of the magnitude of loans (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) conclude that lenders may not choose to increase collateral 
requirements for larger loan sizes since it will result in adverse selection effects. Therefore, credit 
rationing can occur even in a competitive equilibrium. Wette (1983) shows that increases in 
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collateral can lead to adverse selection effects even if borrowers and lenders are risk neutral; 
therefore, credit rationing cannot be avoided in equilibrium. 
Bester (1985, 1987), however, argues that credit rationing will not occur in equilibrium if 
banks compete by simultaneously choosing collateral requirements and interest rates to screen 
borrowers. The results are based on assumptions including the existence of a direct relationship 
between riskiness and preferences of borrowers, and the ability of low risk borrowers to raise 
sufficient amounts of collateral to distinguish themselves from high risk ones. Rationing may occur, 
however, even in equilibrium if these assumptions are violated and if the interest rate restrictions and 
lack of infinite supply of funds exist, and if the lack of enforcement mechanisms renders asset 
liquidation impossible. Chan and Thaker (1987) show that if the costs of collateralization are high, 
it is possible for low risk borrowers who offer more collateral to be rationed out of the market even 
if banks have idle funds. Furthermore, Bester (1994) in his later work concludes that debt 
renegotiation at the end of the contracting period may seriously undermine the role of collateral as 
a signalling device. In this case, credit rationing occurs even in equilibrium. 
C. Synthesis of the Theoretical Models 
The theoretical literature summarized above shows that while some models predict that 
collateral has a signalling value to sort borrowers, others emphasize its enforcement and incentive 
effects on loan repayment. Both the signalling and the enforcement models predict that collateral 
will generally not be used in loan contracts that involve known low risk borrowers, but it will be 
more prevalent in lending to smaller firms. The two types of models differ only in that enforcement 
models predict that high risk borrowers and small finns provide collateral, while signalling models 
predict that low risk borrowers in any size category offer more collateral than high risk borrowers. 
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The theoretical models generally predict that lender profits increase with increases in 
collateral if there are no direct costs for them in liquidating it at the time of default. But collateral 
imposes some costs on both borrowers and lenders irrespective of whether the borrowers actually 
default. The risk of incurring high transaction costs in the event ofunintended default may imply 
that farmers may forego the use of collateral even though it limits their access to loans (Feder, 1988). 
The costs of collateralization is expected to break the direct relationship between collateral used and 
loan size. 
The majority of the theoretical models are based on the assumption that the risk type of a 
borrower is revealed by the collateral offered for a loan. 'When collateral is a binding constraint and 
the costs of collateralization is high, lenders cannot sort borrowers based on collateral choice alone. 
Furthermore, when collateral is imperfect and heterogenous, it is difficult to delineate its actual role. 
In addition, lenders are not always diligent in their collection techniques so bad borrowers may 
mimic good borrowers, especially when both good and bad borrowers are not limited by assets that 
can be offered as collateral. A full equilibrium analysis of the loan market in a dynamic setting is 
required in order to explain the quantity of collateral required for loans along with the determination 
of interest rates and loan quantities. 
2. Empirical Evidence 
Several studies exist that reveal the preponderant use of collateral in many rural financial 
markets and the use of innovative mechanisms that substitute for conventional collateral to provide 
loan services. They are, however, largely descriptive. It is difficult to conduct rigorous empirical 
examinations of the role of collateral in rural lending because several types of perfect and imperfect 
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collateral are used by borrowers to secure loans or to signal their risk types. Furthermore, the terms 
and conditions of the loan contracts are often simultaneously formed so efforts to assess their 
interaction effects have generally been futile and have led to erroneous results. In addition, the lack 
of data about potential borrowers who self-select themselves out of the credit market due to their 
perceptions that collateral is required to apply for loans, and the lack of information about the actual 
reasons used by lenders to reject applicants may seriously bias the analysis and lead to 
underestimating/overestimating the role of collateral in improving access to loans. Nonetheless, 
some empirical evidence supports the theoretical predictions summarized above. While collateral 
seems to matter for loans by increasing the probability of obtaining loans and/or receiving larger 
sized loans, these relationships may hold only over a specific range of loan sizes. The qualifications 
to these relationships include limits on the assets available as collateral, limits on loanable funds by 
lenders, costs of collaterilization, the institutional environment, and the availability of markets to 
liquidate collateral in case ofloan default. While collateral may reduce loan size rationing, where 
borrowers are supplied loan amounts smaller than demanded, and loan quantity rationing, where 
some loan applicants are totally rejected, it cannot completely eliminate it. 
A. Collateral and Loan Size 
Collateral can affect loan size rationing. Feder et al. (1988) showed that access to 
institutional loans and loan sizes increased with increases in the amount and value of land offered 
as collateral in Thailand. The size of loans granted increased with the security of land titles. In 
addition, farmers who provided land as collateral obtained larger loans than farmers who provided 
a group loan guarantee. Collateral substitutes such as market interlinkages were often used in 
informal credit markets. Nagaraj an (1992) found in rice growing areas of the Philippines that loan 
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sizes were correlated with the type of collateral substitutes used to match the interests of the lenders 
and borrowers. Loans from trader lenders were larger for farm households that offered a marketable 
rice surplus as collateral than for those who offered no such collateral substitute. 
Binswanger et al. (1986) examined the limits to the effect of collateral on loan sizes in India. 
The study indicated that the probability of obtaining loans from formal lenders was determined by 
the amount and form of the borrower's assets that have high collateral value, and by the borrower's 
personal characteristics. Increases in the borrower's wealth also increased the likelihood of getting 
better loan terms and a larger loan size. Increasing land area operated increased total credit use up 
to nine hectares of land, but then progressively reduced it. The size of loan obtained from 
institutional lenders increased with the size of operational land holding up to 15 hectares, but then 
loan size declined with larger land area operated. The existence of other physical assets had no clear 
relationship with small loans, but tended to be positively correlated with larger loans. The point 
where physical assets as collateral start to matter was reached earlier for informal than for formal 
loans. Loan sizes from both institutional and informal lenders were insignificant at lower asset 
levels, but were significantly positive after asset position reached a certain value. Land and labor 
market relationships were not significantly related to loan size but both land collateral and third party 
guarantees were positively and significantly related. 
B. Collateral and Loan Quantity 
Collateral is only one of the factors that affects loan quantity rationing. For example, Llanto 
and Dingcong (1994) sampled 34 banks in the Philippines and observed that lenders ranked the 
following factors in evaluating borrowers: (i) project viability, (ii) character/reputation, (iii) capacity 
to repay, (iv) marketability of collateral, and (v) sources of income. A premium was placed on the 
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anticipated income/profits of the borrower's project rather than on collateral. However, when 
collateral was provided, the probability of quantity rationing was observed to be lower the larger the 
ratio of value ofthe collateral offered to the loan size. 
C. Collateral and Interest Rate 
Collateral can also affect the interest rates charged. Swaminathan (1992) showed that 
systematic relationships existed between types of collateral used and interest rates on credit contracts 
in Indian villages. Both formal and informal lenders ranked immovable assets and gold as having 
high collateral values while assets such as promissory notes and movable assets were ranked low. 
The highest rates of interest in informal markets were charged for loans secured by movable assets. 
The next highest were loans with no collateral while the lowest were charged for immovable assets 
such as land and buildings. An inverse relationship was observed between the value of land owned 
and the average rates of interest charged on informal loans. In another study in India, Binswanger 
et al. (1986) showed that while formal lenders gave smaller size loans and charged high interest rates 
for borrowers without collateral, they gave larger loans at lower interest rates to borrowers in good 
standing or with large amounts of collateral. 
D. Collateral and Institutional Environment 
The social environment and the lack of enforcement mechanisms in a country may undennine 
the use of certain assets as collateral. In India, although only a few borrowers were able to obtain 
bank loans without formal collateral in the form of land, only a few banks were able to actually 
foreclose on land in the event of loan default because of social resistance to buy "unlucky lands" 
(Binswanger et al., 1986). A similar situation was noted in Cyprus, Jordan and Tunisia where banks 
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rarely foreclosed on land collateral during the past three decades even though default rates were high 
(NENARACA, 1994). 
Actions of the state can also undermine the use of certain assets such as land as collateral. 
For example, small informal lenders in India could not use land as collateral since they were not 
registered under the moneylending registration act and hence promissory notes on land were not 
enforceable (Binswanger et al., 1986). In Korea, government restrictions on the use of land as 
collateral led to the use ofthird party guarantors for bank loans. However, informal lenders used 
land through disguised conditional sale contracts (Feder et al., 1988). Similarly, in the Philippines, 
restrictions on the transfer of land titles by land reform beneficiaries to only their legal heirs limited 
the use of land as collateral by formal banks. This has led to land pawning in informal credit 
markets (Nagarajan et al. 1992). 
The absence of insurance markets in developing countries can also result in a reluctance by 
borrowers to provide collateral or to tie it up in loan contracts because assets are required to smooth 
out their consumption expenditures and to mitigate unforeseen contingencies. However, if credit 
and/or labor markets can perfectly substitute for insurance markets, then the borrower will likely be 
less risk averse to using collateral for loans. 
IV. COLLATERAL/COLLATERAL SUBSTITUTES USED IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Collateral is widely used to place moral pressure on the borrower rather than to actually force 
loan repayment. While formal lenders generally require tradeable assets as collateral, informal 
lenders often grant loans with no explicit collateral or accept tradeable and nontradeable 
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collateral/collateral substitutes. In addition, informal lenders design loan contracts in such a way that 
other terms and conditions substitute for the conventional collateral. Experiments are underway in 
several developing countries to devise collateral/collateral substitutes that will be effective in the 
local environment. This section will flrst list the types of collateral/collateral substitutes used in 
developing countries, and will then assess their strengths and weaknesses. 
1. Collateral Used in Formal Credit Markets 
Land with clear legal title is the most commonly accepted collateral for farm loans in 
developing countries. However, when institutional impediments exist, group guarantees have been 
widely used in several Asian countries. Evidence from Thailand and India shows that the majority 
of titled farmers have provided land as loan collateral while untitled farmers offered group 
guarantees to obtain bank loans (Feder et al., 1988). In the Philippines, the most commonly accepted 
collateral has included titled real estate, machinery, vehicles and equipment, standing crops through 
the issuance of promissory notes, working animals and, lastly, inventory. Farm lands have not been 
generally accepted as collateral from land reform beneficiaries due to restrictions on the transfer of 
land rights only to legal heirs (Llanto and Dingcong, 1994). Banks in Sri Lanka have accepted 
identity cards as a collateral substitute to establish the reputation of a borrower (Herath, 1994). 
In Africa, movable assets and crops have been the most widely used collateral, followed in 
importance by land. The most frequent forms of collateral used have included mortgages on titled 
lands, registered movable assets, crops and livestock, term deposits, salary orders, negotiable 
instruments of bills and bonds, insurance policies and company share certificates, and to a lesser 
extent, third party guarantees, joint group liability, guarantee funds and the pledge of receivables. 
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For example, in Zimbabwe and Kenya all of the above mentioned types of collateral have been used. 
In Mali, only movable assets and crops are used (AFRACA, 1994). Group savings have been 
accepted as collateral for individual member loans in few African countries (Seibal and Marx, 1987). 
Large producers-exporters have been accepted as guarantors for loans extended to their outgrowers 
in Uganda, and post-shipment loans have been provided to pineapple exporters based on accounts 
receivables from importers (Nagarajan et al, 1994). 
Agricultural projects in countries in the Near East have frequently used mortgages on 
officially registered immovable assets such as agricultural land and real estates and buildings, and 
third party guarantees. In addition, commercial bank guarantees for client's loans have been 
observed in Morocco, Oman, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Sudan and Iran while shares and bonds have 
been used in Oman, Tunisia and Iran. Chattel mortgages on registered and insured machinery, 
trucks, etc. were found among formal banks in Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Iran and Oman. Livestock 
are accepted in Tunisia if they are insured for life and are sold under state control. Bank deposits 
have also been used in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Cyprus. Crop pledging with insurance have been 
accepted for only short-term and irrigated crops in Iran, Tunisia and Algeria. Egypt, Sudan and 
Algeria accept warehouse receipts. Post dated checks and employee salaries accompanied by 
guarantors are accepted as collateral in Oman and Sudan (NENARACA, 1994). 
With the exception of Cuba, mortgaging of farm lands and real estates, and the pledging of 
machineries/equipmentsllivestock and third party guarantees have been widely used in several Latin 
American countries as loan collateral. Several formal lenders in Brazil, Mexico and Peru also accept 
as collateral warehouse receipts for non-perishable commodities including firewood and charcoal, 
and savings deposits. Guarantee funds have been commonly used in Mexico, Brazil and Columbia 
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to secure loans to small fanners. In Columbia, the trustees of guarantee funds issue collateral 
certificates that can be used as collateral (ALIDE, 1994). 
For medium and large non-farm enterprises, promissory notes, letters of credit, warehouse 
receipts, merchandise, third party guarantees, savings accounts and accounts receivables are widely 
used as collateral in Latin America and Asia. In addition, large firms in the Dominican Republic and 
Mexico are observed to offer their commercial paper to borrow from other firms, individuals and 
banks (Adams, 1994a; Mansell, 1992). For small scale enterprises, while there exist several donor 
funded guarantee funds, they are seldom used as collateral. In addition, small scale enterprises only 
have access to special small enterprise programs such as the ones found in The Gambia and Senegal. 
The Swazi Business Growth Trust in Swaziland has been providing loans to established small firms 
using third party guarantors, and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh accepts group guarantees. 
Semi-formal institutions, such as NGOs, are becoming increasingly active in providing 
financial services in several developing countries. Several successful NGOs have tended to 
concentrate on non-agricultural activities rather than on agricultural activities (Drake and Otero, 
1992; Graham, Meyer and Cuevas, 1993). Successful NGO programs in The Gambia, Dominican 
Republic and Columbia were observed to accept as collateral assets other than land, such as jewels, 
livestock, and group guarantees, third party guarantees and guarantee funds to provide loans. 
2. Collateral used in Informal Credit Markets 
In general, the collateral/collateral substitutes used in informal markets range from the widely 
acceptable collateral such as land on the one extreme to less marketable assets such as reputation, 
long-term relationships (business and familial), the threat ofloss of future loans and social ostracism 
20 
on the other extreme. The lenders based on their specializations choose the most appropriate 
collateral/collateral substitute to consummate transactions. Therefore, borrowers rationed out of 
formal markets often are able to access informal loans. 
Short-term loans are made among friends and relatives without any explicit collateral but 
with an implicit promise to repay and to reciprocate the favor in the future if the fortunes of the 
lender are reversed. Short-term loans from trader and farmer lenders have been observed to involve 
land, labor and product market interlinkages in India and the Philippines (Esguerra and Meyer, 1992; 
Bell, 1990). Consumer durables and animals are ranked to have low collateral value. Land is used 
only to fmance long-term and large sized loans. When risks are small and the borrower's projects 
are economically viable, informal lenders are willing to tolerate some amount of legal ambiguity. 
This was observed in the Philippines where informal lenders accept the pawning of land cultivation 
rights from land reform beneficiaries who were otherwise restricted by agrarian reform laws to 
transfer their ownership rights only to their legal heirs. While the majority of countries have been 
slow to provide a strong legal environment to enforce informal loan contracts, traditional social laws 
and customs are supportive. 
In general, long-term relations and reputation play a major role in facilitating transactions 
in informal credit markets. Informal lenders in Korea who have some familial connections with 
borrowers were found to accept less physical collateral compared to lenders with business 
relationships in the credit and related markets (Feder et al., 1988). Nagarajan (1992) also noted 
similar trends in The Philippines among rice farmers and farmer and trader lenders. Because of their 
proximity to their borrowers, farmer lenders relied more on the reputation of their borrowers while 
trader lenders more frequently required physical assets as collateral. Small and microenterprises 
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usually received credit from friends and relatives using familial and long-term relationships as 
collateral. Only a few established firms accessed supplier and buyer credits using reputation and 
business relationships as collateral. 
3. Assessment of Collateral/Collateral Substitutes 
The collateral and signalling value of different types of assets are based on their rates of 
return and their inherent riskiness due to the local institutional environment. 
A. Land: Land is the least risky and commonly used collateral in developing 
countries, especially where property rights are clearly defined. The utility of land as collateral to a 
lender, however, depends on the social and legal environment that allows foreclosure and taking 
possession of land in the event of default. 
B. Chattel assets: The majority of the rural poor possess livestock and small 
scale machinery that can be effectively used as collateral, but these assets are characterized by high 
collateral-specific risks. Generally, animals are poor forms of collateral and can be used only when 
there exist good rental and insurance markets. Chattel assets are considered as undesirable collateral 
as they lack registration title, are easily movable and can be disposed of without the knowledge of 
the lender. Leases can be considered as chattels but they need to be perfected by possession or 
public filing. In general, chattels are enforceable and lenders can establish seniority over their 
claims. But government tax authorities can flle liens on borrower's chattels and subsequent loans 
made by banks for such borrowers using the chattels may have only secondary claims. 
C. Third party guarantees: This form of collateral is commonly used by formal 
lenders in many developing countries. However, these guarantees involve additional costs to the 
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lender since the guarantors also need to be assessed for their character and credit worthiness in 
addition to the borrower. Legally, a guarantor in the United States may refuse to repay the loan if 
the borrower has used the money for a purpose different than was originally stated in the contract 
(Larr, 1994). 
D. Group guarantees: Peer pressure can minimize strategic loan defaults and act 
as a form of social collateral. The experience of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh suggests that 
group guarantees increase repayment rates. However, the repayment performance of several group 
guarantee programs has been poor and many have run into serious viability problems (Huppi and 
Feder, 1990). The rapid growth of such programs can be attributed to subsidized lending in many 
developing countries. Group guarantees can serve as effective collateral/collateral substitutes only 
if several conditions are satisfied such as member homogeneity with respect to economic and social 
criteria, small size of group membership and sufficient lending spreads in the loan contracts to cover 
eventual loan losses. In addition, group loans involve group formation costs that are either borne 
by the lender or the borrowers. It has been observed that the reduction in lending risk through a 
group guaranty is not very significant compared to the risk of individual loans. 
E. Warehouse receipts: Warehouse receipts are a convenient form of collateral 
that can be accepted by banks. However, it is necessary that the country's legal system recognizes 
as collateral a fungible and perishable commodity such as grain deposited in a warehouse. It can be 
risky to rely on warehouse inventories because stored commodities can be inadvertently sold or 
purposefully pledged to another creditor without the lender's knowledge. Therefore, securities such 
as warehouse receipts need to be backed up with a system of warehouse bonding. Lenders need to 
know that the grain is actually deposited in the warehouse and that the warehouse or the borrower 
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has the right to sell it and use it to secure loans. Use of a third party collateral manager can also 
increase the value of the stored crop/product. 
F. Savings funds: In some African countries, group savings deposited in a bank 
are used as collateral for individual group member loans. In addition, a two tier guarantee system 
wherein group savings serve as a first tier guarantee and matching funds from an N GO functions as 
a second tier guarantee is also useful as collateral to provide individual loans to group members 
(Seibal and Marx, 1987). Use of compensating balances wherein savings/certificates of deposits are 
blocked to secure loans, especially when the collateral offered is weak, can also serve as collateral. 
Savings signal to the lender that the borrower is disciplined. However, the use of savings funds 
involve costs in mobilizing savings and in record keeping. 
G. Reputation: Contracts to repeat borrowers essentially replicate previous loans 
with modifications to meet new circumstances. Therefore, the reputation that borrowers gain 
through long association and repeat transactions can reduce the time lenders need to evaluate the 
credit worthiness of repeat borrowers. Furthermore, reputation can effectively enforce contracts in 
traditional societies. However, borrowers need to fust establish their reputation because they suffer 
from the "liability of newness." In addition, formal lenders are often limited in their capacity to 
assess the qualitative attributes of a borrower so that a collateral substitute such as reputation cannot 
be traded in a market to recover loans. 
H. Guarantee funds: Guarantee funds are increasingly used to support lending 
to small and poor borrowers who are unable to offer physical collateral and/or may be unable to 
repay due to unforeseen natural calamities. Although such funds are favored by donors, they have 
a questionable impact on increasing the volume of rural lending, as observed in The Gambia, 
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Swaziland and Uganda 4. Performance may improve if the formation of guarantee funds involves 
the participation of the borrowers. Informal groups such as Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations in The Gambia reduce delinquency and default problems by effectively using a 
contingency fund formed by their members. In Tunisia, a guarantee fund at the Central bank gets 
contributiOns from borrowers up to 12% of the loan amount granted. In Egypt, an experiment is 
being conducted in which specialized companies called collateral lenders are undertaking guarantees 
for commercial bank loans. A two stage guarantee fund can be effective wherein donors match the 
contingency fund established by borrowers. 
I. Insurance: The availability of insurance can convert risky assets into more 
secure ones and make them usable as collateral. However, incentives such as high personal liability 
for the loan are needed to encourage borrowers to buy insurance. The Comprehensive Crop 
Insurance Scheme (CCIS) for short-term agricultural loans in India was observed to substantially 
expand the number and size ofloans made to insured small farmers (Mishra, 1994). However, crop 
insurance and insurance for other assets used as collateral, such as animals, is often not available or 
is expensive due to several reasons including problems in screening, monitoring and enforcing 
insurance contracts. 
In general, the acceptability of collateral/collateral substitutes depends on the ability of a 
lender to adequately evaluate the value of it in a given legal environment. Otherwise, the costs of 
loan foreclosure and seizing the collateral may far exceed the benefits of using it to secure a loan. 
Furthermore, the lack of or improper valuation can lead to undervaluation or the rejection of assets 
4 See also Levitsky and Prasad (1987). 
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offered as collateral. This will result in a reduced number and size of loans, and problems in 
enforceability of loan repayment and liquidation of pledged assets. The next section elaborates on 
these points. 
V. ISSUES IN EVALUATING COLLATERAL/COLLATERAL SUBSTITUTES 
Evaluation is the process used by lenders to appraise the quality and value of the collateral 
offered by borrowers in a given legal environment and it requires the existence of markets or some 
other suitable method to determine the use value of assets (Meyer, Graham and Cuevas, 1992). 
Valuation ensures that the fundamental requirements including security and marketability of the 
asset are satisfied so that lenders are assured of their claims over it. Specifically, valuation needs 
to clarify: Who is the true owner of the collateral? Who has the right to assign or pledge it? Does 
the title to the asset have any restrictions? Can it be located? Are there any other liens? How can 
it be secured? What is the real value of the asset: market, replacement or book value? How liquid 
is the asset? How marketable is it? How is it insured against fraud?. This section will discuss these 
issues. 
1. Security of Collateral 
The value and marketability of an asset offered as collateral is affected in part by the method 
through which it is secured by the lender. When the collateral remains with the borrower but can 
be possessed and liquidated by the lender to cover loan losses in the event of default, then the 
lender's security interest is "attached" to that asset. The risk to the lender is that the borrower can 
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liquidate an attached security to a third party without the lender's knowledge before the end ofthe 
contract so the lender may not be able to claim it in case of bankruptcy. On the other hand, when 
the lender takes physical possession of the collateral (eg: pawning) or when the law assures the 
lender of a senior claim to it, then the security interest is "perfected." The ability of the lender to 
perfect a security also prevents the borrower from incurring additional debts using the same 
collateral. A legal environment with no provision for registration of assets offered as security only 
allows for attaching an interest to a security and not perfecting it. An example is cited from Ghana 
where lenders cannot register their rights to grain offered as security thereby reducing the collateral 
value ofwarehouse receipts (FAO, 1994). 
Differences between negotiable and non-negotiable contracts also play a major role in 
determining their value as collateral. A negotiable contract allows the lender to either take 
possession of the collateral or transfer the rights to a buyer so they can be liquidated to cover loan 
losses. For example, in India, warehouse law allows warehouse receipts to be written as a negotiable 
instrument, while in Ghana they are not included under negotiable instruments so this reduces their 
collateral value (FAO, 1994). 
2. Valuation of Collateral 
Valuation of collateral is expensive. High and variable inflation rates make asset valuation 
more difficult, and high volatility in the economic and political environment will tend to depreciate 
the value of collateral. Limited information about various types of collateral and lengthy legal 
procedures also pose problems for lenders in liquidating assets. 
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In practice, while some financial institutions use the fair market value method of asset 
evaluation, the majority use the forced sale value method after discounting for unexpected 
uncertainties. Most of the formal lenders in Sub-Saharan Africa use external independent valuators 
while government valuations are used in Near East countries (AFRACA, 1994; NENARACA, 
1994). In Egypt, the lenders accept the borrowers' evaluation of their collateral if it sounds 
reasonable. The absence of markets in several developing countries for some assets, however, makes 
valuation difficult. 
3. Establishing Loan to Collateral Ratios 
Proper collateral evaluation helps to determine the ratios ofloan size to collateral value since 
the expected rate of asset appreciation or depreciation, the certainty of price expectations, and the 
costs of liquidation need to be considered in determining the ratio. The maximum allowable loan 
as a fraction of current market value of the asset should increase with the rate of appreciation of the 
asset. 
In practice, these ratios vary among countries, institutions within a country, for borrowers 
within an institution and by types of collateral offered. The loan-collateral ratio in the Philippines 
averaged 64% and ranged from one to more than 100%, while it ranged from 45 to 100% in Sub-
Saharan Africa and from 30 to 130% in Latin America (Llanto and Dingong, 1994; AFRACA, 1994; 
ALIDE, 1994). Banks in Zambia takes the capitalized interest for the full term into account while 
calculating the ratio. In the Agricultural Development Bank of Ghana, the commercial values of 
collateral are discounted by as much as 49% to create the required safety margin. In Kenya, only 
the principal amount of the loan is taken into account in calculating the ratio (AFRACA, 1994). 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKERS, DONORS AND 
GOVERNMENTS 
Inadequate conventional collateral has been assumed to lead to restricted access to formal 
credit for rural borrowers. This paper shows that while collateral matters for improving access to 
loans and to loans of larger size, these relationships may hold only when specific conditions are met. 
The conditions include strong markets and legal institutions, and political and social willingness to 
allow collateral perform its prescribed role 5. Therefore, efforts to increase access to rural finance 
must go far beyond simply improving access to collateral. The above conclusion is strengthened by 
three major observations: (i) while the majority of formal lenders still rely upon the traditional 
approach of requiring conventional collateral, such as land, to secure loans, several types of 
collateral substitutes are being used in rural formal financial markets, (ii) semi formal and informal 
fmancial arrangements have found several collateral substitutes to secure loans without relying on 
conventional collateral so borrowers rationed out of formal loans are often able to access from these 
sources, and (iii) the social, economic and legal environment within which the banks operate 
frequently influences the acceptability and value of assets used as collateral. 
Several policy implications arise from the above analysis. The first concerns the traditional 
use ofland as collateral. The absence ofwell-defmed property rights, and inefficient and unreliable 
legal systems in developing countries are often cited as constraints on the effective use of it. 
5 Anecdotal evidence from developed countries with facilitating institutional, political and 
social conditions show that formal lenders use collateral only to provide large and longer term 
loans. New applicants (with no credit/savings history with the bank) for short term and smaller 
sized loans are not asked to offer any collateral but are generally rationed out. This is because of 
the high costs of collateralization and time costs in foreclosing collateral for small loans. 
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Therefore, there is a need to improve the security and transferability of land titles and to strengthen 
the environment in which it is used as collateral. As a result, extensive land titling programs are 
often recommended to improve the functioning of land markets and to improve access to formal 
credit markets for holders of land. This argument is supported by empirical evidence that shows that 
access to formal loans increases as the security of land titles increase in Thailand, and with the 
official granting of occupation certificates in Nigeria. The Philippines experience, on the other hand, 
suggests that agrarian reform laws which restrict land transfers by land reform beneficiaries reduces 
the collateral value ofland. Titling programs, however, are difficult and costly to implement. This 
gives rise to the need for other methods to improve access to formal loans for persons who already 
have some access to land or cultivation rights, but still face difficulties in accessing formal loans. 
While improving the property rights for land and the legal system to enforce loan contracts 
may be necessary conditions, they are not sufficient conditions to make land an acceptable collateral 
for formal lenders. There are at least two sufficient conditions. First, land pledged as collateral must 
have value, which requires the existence of markets or other methods to determine land use value. 
In many developing countries, however, land markets are thin or nonexistent. Water rights convey 
significantly more value than land use rights in several Sub-Saharan African countries. Indeed, other 
assets, such as livestock, consumer durables, or use rights to plantations, may better meet the 
appropriability, value, and enforceability conditions for acceptable collateral than do land use rights. 
Second, the eventual transfer of control over land pledged as collateral must be socially enforceable, 
which implies that a socially accepted mechanism of contract enforcement must exist. The existence 
of a legal system may not be a sufficient condition for effective contract enforcement, if legal action, 
such as foreclosure on collateral, is not a credible threat to the potential defaulter. Social customs 
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or political imperatives may make it impossible for banks to foreclose on land that secures a 
defaulted loan. In some areas of Kenya, for example, land has little collateral value because land 
transfers to outsiders through sale or foreclosure are not always socially accepted as legitimate 
(Meyer, Graham and Cuevas, 1992). Formal lenders need to devise innovative mechanisms for 
increasing the use value of land. It is imperative that incentive compatible loan contracts are 
designed that incorporate an appropriate role for land as collateral. For example, formal lenders may 
be able to accept tribal/communal lands as collateral for individual loans by getting the loans 
witnessed by village headsmen who can apply social sanctions in the event of default. 
Given the limitations of land as collateral, formal lenders need to consider using assets other 
than land and collateral substitutes, such as third party guarantors, witnessing of contracts by local 
authorities and group guarantees, to improve access to formal loans. Mechanisms should be devised 
to use a combination of collateral and collateral substitutes such as reputation and character based 
lending. It may be difficult for formal credit institutions to accept all the collateral substitutes used 
by informal lenders to improve borrower access to credit, but they may be able to learn from 
informal lender techniques. The experiments now underway in which formal lenders mimic 
informal lenders or formal institutions are linked with various types of informal financial 
arrangements may prove to be promising innovations. Furthermore, innovative techniques used by 
formal lenders, such as the use of outgrower fmance schemes, identity cards, group savings, accounts 
receivables, inventory, etc. need to be monitored for possible replication so that collateraVcollateral 
substitutes can be more widely utilized to improve loan access for rural borrowers. There may be 
important lessons to be learned from informal lenders and third party commercial finance companies 
in Egypt called collateral lenders. 
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The donors have an important role to play in helping resolve collateral issues. They can 
finance innovative financial programs that provide technical assistance and seed capital, 
systematically conduct comparative analyses and disseminate the results of experiments, and 
contribute capital to leverage group savings programs that have improved access to loans. Caution 
must be exercisized, however, so that indigenous self-help initiatives are not undermined by 
excessive amounts of outside funds from enthusiastic well-intentioned donors. In addition, more 
empirical research is needed to carefully and rigorously analyze collateral and non-collateral 
determinants of access to formal loans, to study potential borrowers who self-select themselves out 
of the credit markets due to perceptions about collateral and access to loans, and to analyze the actual 
reasons for lenders rejecting certain applicants. In addition, NGOs that successfully provide 
financial services need to be evaluated to determine how effectively they use collateral/collateral 
substitutes in lending. Their financial services need to be more carefully analyzed to assess if they 
really contribute to integrating rural financial markets and to economic growth, or if they simply 
serve a niche market and alleviate poverty for participants in their specific programs. It is important 
to determine if they are really developing techniques that can be adopted in formal financial markets 
by financial institutions providing sustainable services. Since group lending is so widely used by 
NGOs, careful analysis is needed to determine if and where it is actually superior to individual 
lending in improving loan access to the rural poor. 
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